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Introduction 
 
Understanding the choices that people make are fundamental to our understanding of human behaviour; 
what product to purchase, what colour to order, which activity to engage in, which mode to use while 
travelling, which route to take while driving, what energy source to use and in what quantity, what food 
to consume, what hospital to visit, or which job to take are diverse examples where understanding these 
choices has real economic and social implications. Given the ubiquity of choices, researchers across a 
breadth of social sciences, be it marketers, transportation planners, energy forecasters, environmental 
scientists, or health and labour economists, have investigated this behaviour. 
 
While our knowledge of these choices continues to grow and our suite of techniques for modelling these 
choices increases in sophistication, the overwhelming majority of studies have investigated the choices 
made by a single decision maker. Many decision, however, are not made by a single person alone. 
Arguably, some of the more important life decisions, many with a combination of long-term impacts 
and significant financial implications, are made by multiple people acting in concert. Within a 
household alone, where to live, what house to purchase, what employment to take, which school to send 
children, where to go for holiday, and what car to buy are small number of examples where, more often 
than not, multiple decision makers are involved acting with varying degree of influence and bargaining 
power. 
 
The role of influence in group choices has been a matter of interest for many years. Coulson (1966) 
observed that other members of the family exert considerable influence on the housewife in making 
brand decisions. A decade later Wind (1976) emphasises that having identified members of the buying 
unit, one would ideally like to examine the dynamics of the purchase and consumption decision 
processes among all the relevant members of the unit, a decade after that Corfman and Lehmann (1987) 
investigated the process of conflict resolution in household purchase decisions and in an econometric 
framework Chiappori (1988) demonstrated that households act altruistically to make Pareto efficient 
choices, rather than engaging as unitary decision makers. Another decade later, a convergent stream of 
formalised models of household choices that sought to formally estimates degrees of influence within 
the random utility framework began to emerge. 
 
Krishnamurthi (1988) proposed the first of the published two stage conjoint models that provide a 
framework over which influence can be measured. The first stage is to collect the preference of the 
individuals in the household pair, the second stage collecting the ultimate choice of the household. Other 
nascent examples that use a similar approach include Arora and Allenby (1999) who examine the 
choices of husbands and wives in the household choice of lawn-mowers and ovens; Brewer and Hensher 
(2000) who use a slightly different approach to examine choices between employers and employees; 
Aribarg et al. (2002) who investigate the choice between teenagers and their parents over computers 
and snack foods; and Dosman and Adamowicz (2002;  subsequently published in 2006) who 
investigated family recreation vacation choice using both stated and revealed preference data. 
Extant in the literature are a growing number of subsequent examples that use a similar approach in a 
variety of choice contexts. While these studies seek to understand the role of influence in the household 
decision making process, there is scope for analysis to better understand how the individuals themselves 
perceive influence. Prior to the use of the two-stage random utility approach to estimate influence, 
researchers interested in the role of power and influence asked respondents what degree of influence 
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they perceived them and their partners held. In examining these types of studies, Davis (1971) observed 
that past studies examining how often husbands and wives reported similar perceptions of influence and 
involvement in aspects of family decision making rarely exceeded 50 percent. Filiatrault and Ritchie 
(1980) found that husbands were perceived to exert the greater influence over the majority of the sub-
decisions involved in household vacation decisions. Interestingly, this study also concluded that 
children had relatively little perceived influence over holiday choices but may still affect the outcome 
of the choice. Spiro (1983) found that perceptions of when a partner is attempting to exert influence are 
not in agreement. Foxman et al. (1989) find that household disagree over their perceptions of the 
influence of adolescents in household decisions, but that they are generally perceived to have some 
influence. 
 
In this paper, we build on this largely dormant area of work in understanding the construction and 
perception of influence within a household choice. We use the two stage model approach to estimate 
the degree of influence each household member exerts over the household choice of an automobile. In 
the same study we also collected data on how much influence each individual perceived that they had 
and how much influence they perceived that their partner had. The following section presents the 
preferred research methodology, along with the extant set of related research methods. Section 3 details 
the empirical procedure utilised to obtain the requisite choice data for our econometric models. This is 
followed by the presentation of empirical results. Lastly, the paper offers concluding remarks relating 
to the results and the next step forward in using such evidence 
 
1. Methodology 
 
The methodology involves two agents independently evaluating a series of choice tasks consisting of 
the same sets of alternatives described by precisely the same attributes and attribute levels. In the 
modelling process, these utility functions are specified by the analyst and form the starting point for the 
analysis of the group decision. These are given as 
 
1
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and        (1) 
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       (2) 
 
where Vai represents the observed utility derived by agent a for alternative i, αai represents a constant 
specific to alternative i (this value can also be generic across alternatives), xik is a vector of k design 
attributes associated with alternative i, βak is the corresponding vector of marginal (dis)utility 
parameters. A similar set of utility functions are estimated for agent b, which is represented by replacing 
subscript a with b in Equation (2). Note that the total utility would be a summation of this observed 
utility plus an error term which captures unobserved utility. 
 
In the interactive agency process, the initial choices made by agents are compared. If the same 
alternative has been selected by both agents then it is inferred that this would be the alternative chosen 
by the group. Where agreement has been reached between the parties, the choice is said to be in 
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equilibrium. After each pass, choice tasks where no equilibrium decision was reached are sent back to 
each agent for re-evaluation where one or more of the agents may revise their choice. This process 
continues until an equilibrium choice is reached or the analyst terminates the process. For the current 
study, a maximum of three passes of feedback and revision were allowed before the process was 
terminated as it was felt that an equilibrium outcome would be unlikely to be reached by that agent pair 
beyond that point. 
 
Likewise, the inferred utility of group g for alternative i defined by k attributes can be defined as: 
 
1
( ).
K
gi gi gk ik
k
V xα β
=
= +∑        (3) 
 
However, if an assumption is made that the group utility is a function of the individual preferences of 
each agent weighted by the level of influence of the agent (or perhaps in the case of a cooperative 
household, the agent’s level of responsibility for the decision or the importance of the decision for one 
agent relative to the other) then it is possible to define the utility of group g as: 
 
( ) ( )(1 ) ,gi gi a ai a biV V Vα ω ω= + + −       (4) 
 
which can be reformulated at as the weighted sum across k attributes given by: 
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where ωak is the measure of influence of agent a possesses relative to agent b with respect to attribute 
k. In this specification the influence measures represented by ωak, along with any alternative specific 
constant used by the analyst, are the only parameters that vary freely within the model. In other words: 
parameters reflecting the tastes of the individuals within the group are taken from the estimated 
individual-level models (2.1 and 2.2). Values of ωak range from zero to one, with a zero result 
representing influence being held solely by agent b, and a value of one equating to the situation where 
the utility of agent a is wholly representative of the group. The midpoint, 0.5, represents the situation 
where both agents contribute equally to the group’s utility. To ensure that ωak is bounded, this parameter 
can be defined as: 
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2. Empirical Data 
 
The data for the current study was collected in Australia in 2009 as part of a larger project designed to 
assess changes in new vehicle purchasing behaviour in response to a vehicle emissions charging 
scheme, specifically the elasticity of demand for low emitting vehicles with respect to a CO2 emission 
charge per kilometre and/or per annum per vehicle. The choice experiment required respondents to trade 
differently fuelled vehicles (petrol, diesel and hybrid technology) across nine attributes (purchase price1, 
fuel price, vehicle registration, annual emissions charge, variable emissions charge, fuel efficiency, 
engine capacity (cylinders), seating capacity, country of manufacture). 
 
In establishing the choice profiles shown to respondents, a D-efficient design was used (Rose and 
Bliemer 2008). To qualify for the sample, respondents must have purchased a new motor vehicle in the 
previous year. Given that the vehicle purchase was relatively recent a quasi-pivot design was used to 
add relevance and aid in the comprehension of the experiment. As the exact specification the vehicle 
purchased by each household was not known, twelve separate experimental designs were generated that 
approximated the type of vehicle a household could have purchase (range of vehicles that a varied by 
size of vehicle, fuel type and whether the vehicle was a luxury or base model variant). 
 
To further increase the realism of the design, attribute level constraints were placed on the design. 
Specifically, the annual and variable surcharge presented within an alternative was conditional on the 
type of fuel used and the fuel efficiency of the vehicle (dirtier fuels and inefficient vehicles paid at least 
the same, or more, than an otherwise identical vehicles); the surcharges for the hybrid could not be 
higher than any other vehicle when the fuel efficiency of the hybrid was equal to or better than any 
other alternative in the choice task; and there needed to be at least one alternative that was the same size 
vehicle (small, medium or large) as of the reference alternative. An example choice task is provided in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
1 The purchase price for the hybrid alternative is $3,000 more at each level in order to recognise that hybrid 
technology is currently more expensive than conventional fuel engines and is defined only as a fuel source that is 
cleaner with respect to emission levels, rather than a specific type of fuel. 
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Figure 1: Example Choice Task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Respondent Perception of Influence 
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In collecting the sample, household dyads were recruited and completed the survey in a central 
location. Each pair jointly completed an initial set of questions with respect to the composition of the 
household vehicle fleet and driving behaviour of household members. Dyads were then separate and 
asked to complete four choice tasks individually and independently of each other; these formed the set 
of responses used to estimate individual level models. The participants then engaged in an interactive 
agency choice experiment whereby the responses for each agent were first compared. Choice tasks in 
which the same alternative was chosen independently were assumed to be the consensus group 
choices, choice sets in which different alternatives were chosen were fed back to respondents. In this 
stage a respondent could elect to maintain their first choice, or select a different alternative. Within 
each task the number of rounds of this feedback and revision process was limited to three; it was 
assumed for such choices that required more than three attempts to negotiate would be unlikely to be a 
consensus choice. 
 
Following this interactive experiment, respondents remained separated to complete individual 
demographics and attitudinal questions before being brought back together to complete household level 
socio-demographics. While the sample was recruited at a household dyad level, pairs were split based 
on who the primary user of the new vehicle would be, the other respondent is termed the secondary. A 
total of 235 household surveys were completed, resulting in 940 choice observations for respondent 
group; primary, secondary and group. Overall the sample of respondents was found to be a suitable 
match to the demographics of the Sydney region where the data was collected. Comparing key statistics 
from the ITLS survey to the demographics of the Sydney region in the 2006 in the brackets: average 
age 44yrs (46yrs); male/female 49%/51% (49%/51%); average weekly income $1074.6 ($1057.69). 
 
3. Results 
Analysis of Perceived Influence of Self 
 
Analysis of perceived influence is decomposed into the two subs-samples that exist in the data; primary 
versus secondary agents. Recall that perceived influence is measured by asking a respondent to assign 
100 points per attribute between themselves and their partner. 100 points to either person would mean 
that that person is perceived to have full control over that and that a 50/50 point’s allocation would 
imply equal influence. Also recall that the primary agent in this study is the one who will the primary 
user of the new motor vehicle, the secondary agent the person who was selected from the household 
who would have input over the purchase of a potential vehicle.  
 
The amount of influence that the primary agents believe they have over each attribute is presented in 
Table 1. Analysis of variance reveals that significant differences exist in the perceived influence over 
each attribute (F = 3.651, sig. = 0.000). Post-hoc analysis via Tukey’s HSD indicated that, in particular, 
the primary agent felt they had significantly more influence over the vehicle price, the fuel price, fuel 
efficiency, engine capacity and country of manufacture of the vehicle. Given that the primary agent will 
be the main user of the vehicle, wanting greater control of these relatively experiential attributes makes 
behavioural sense.  
 
Interestingly, the primary agent perceives influence to be evenly distributed over the cost attributes of 
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vehicle registration (74% of primary agents assign equal weights), annual surcharge (76%) and variable 
surcharge (74%). This may be due to the financial impact on the household that the vehicle choice may 
have. This logic may similarly explain the high number of respondents who assign equal weight to the 
seating capacity attribute (75%). With respect to the distribution of weights, across all vehicle attributes 
only a small percentage of primary respondents perceive themselves to have all of the power (i.e. assign 
100% to themselves) and even smaller percentage perceive that the secondary agent to have all of the 
power. However, a sizeable minority of primary agents perceive themselves to have 90% or more of the 
power for each attribute and there are a much higher proportion of primary agents who believe this 
relative to the perception that the secondary agent has 90% or more. For every attribute, the percentage 
of primary agents who perceive them self to be more powerful than their partner is greater than the 
percentage who perceive them self to be less powerful, with perhaps the exception of the annual 
emissions surcharge. 
 
Table 1: Perceived Influence of the Primary Agent 
 
 Vehicle Price 
Fuel 
Price 
Registratio
n 
Annual 
Surcharge 
Variable 
Surcharge 
Fuel 
Efficiency 
Engine 
Capacity 
Seating 
Capacity 
Country of 
Manu. 
100% to them 1% 4% 7% 4% 4% 5% 6% 2% 5% 
100% to other 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
> 90% to them 7% 10% 11% 6% 5% 12% 12% 5% 8% 
> 90% to other 2% 1% 3% 3% 3% 1% 1% 0% 0% 
Matching (50% each) 53% 68% 74% 76% 73% 52% 52% 75% 68% 
% they have more 37% 26% 17% 13% 15% 35% 35% 18% 26% 
% they have less 10% 6% 9% 11% 13% 13% 14% 7% 6% 
Average (0 to 1) 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.56 
Standard Deviation 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.13 0.15 
 
 
With respect to the secondary agents, whose perceptions of their own influence are presented in Table 
2, there is no significant difference in the average influence a secondary agent assigns themselves across 
the choice attributes (F = 0.467, sig. = 0.879). On average the secondary agent perceives themselves 
as having equal weight to their partner on each attribute in contrast to the primary agent who viewed 
themselves as being more influential over a subset of vehicle features. On the other hand, the responses 
of the secondary agents mirrored those of the primary in that a large majority perceive influence to be 
split equally for registration (75%), annual surcharge (76%), variable surcharge (74%) and seating 
capacity (79%). Secondary agents are slightly more likely to assign full influence over an attribute to 
the primary agent than the primary agent is to assign it to them. Conversely, the secondary agent is less 
likely to perceive themselves to be very dominate over an attribute (i.e. assign themselves a weighting 
of 90% or more) in comparison to primary agents. For other than the country of manufacture variable, 
the number of secondary agents who believe they have more control over than attribute than their 
partner is less than the number who perceive them self to be the weaker agent. 
 
One similarity between the primary and secondary agents, as discussed, is that both perceive largely 
equal influence between agents for the annual and variable surcharges, as well as vehicle seating 
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capacity. While the previous explanation surrounding the household impact of these variables making 
them an attribute that agents would be more inclined to view as a true joint equilibrium, an alternative 
explanation may also exist. As both of these attributes are hypothetical constructs, it may be that either 
agent has no clearly defined preference for either themselves or their partner. This lack of clarity over 
preferences may be driving the agents do put an assign influence as being equal over these two 
attributes. For the seating capacity variable it may alternatively be explained that the seating 
requirements of a household are known and fixed, as such there may be little room for negotiation so 
influence is equally assigned. 
 
Table 2: Perceived Influence of the Secondary Agent 
 
 Vehicle Price 
Fuel 
Price 
Registratio
n 
Annual 
Surcharge 
Variable 
Surcharge 
Fuel 
Efficiency 
Engine 
Capacity 
Seating 
Capacity 
Country of 
Manu. 
100% to them 1% 3% 5% 2% 2% 2% 6% 2% 4% 
100% to other 1% 4% 5% 3% 4% 2% 2% 1% 2% 
> 90% to them 3% 5% 6% 3% 3% 3% 7% 2% 6% 
> 90% to other 2% 5% 7% 5% 5% 3% 6% 1% 3% 
Matching (50% each) 61% 69% 75% 76% 74% 64% 55% 79% 73% 
% they have more 18% 14% 12% 11% 12% 18% 20% 10% 15% 
% they have less 21% 17% 13% 13% 14% 18% 25% 11% 13% 
Average (0 to 1) 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.51 
Standard Deviation 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.2 0.12 0.16 
 
 
An approximation of overall influence construct can be created by taking the average power each 
respondent assigns to them self over each attribute.2 The analyses of these constructs are presented in 
Table 3. The overall influence average that the primary agents assign themselves is 55%, which is 
significantly higher than the equal influence average of 50% that the secondary agents assign 
themselves (t = 4.377, sig. = 0.000). Thus, overall the secondary agent views themselves as being an 
equal player in the choice of a motor vehicle, whereas the primary agent believes themselves to be the 
significantly influential decision maker. This can clearly be seen in the number of primary agents who, 
on average over all attributes, perceive them self to have more power than their partner compared to the 
number of secondary agents who feel the same. Interestingly, neither agent believes that they are totally 
dominant or that their partner has 100% of the influence either. 
 
 
 
 
2 This is not a true measure of overall influence as it does not take into account how much weight that 
respondents or groups place on each individual attribute. For example  if the price of the vehicle is the dominant 
attribute in the choice and all the other attributes are insignificant, the agent who has most influence over price 
is likely to have the most influence overall, regardless of their influence on the other attributes. 
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Table 3: Approximate Overall Perceived Influence 
 
 Primary Agent Secondary Agent 
100% to them 0% 0% 
100% to other 0% 0% 
> 90% to them 3% 1% 
> 90% to other 0% 1% 
Matching (50% each) 25% 32% 
% they have more 55% 30% 
% they have less 20% 38% 
 Average (0 to 1) 0.55 0.50 
Standard Deviation 0.12 0.11 
 
 
4. Differences in Perceived Influence of Self 
 
The within-household differences in the levels of influence that primary and secondary agents assign 
themselves are presented in Table 4. On average, the primary agent perceives them self to have a 
significantly higher level of influence than what the secondary self-assigns for vehicle price, fuel price, 
registration, fuel efficiency, engine capacity, seating capacity and country of manufacture. The only 
variables where there is no significant difference in the influence that each agent within the household 
assigns to themselves is over the hypothetical variables of annual and variable surcharge. This again 
suggests that the default perception for these unexperienced variables is for both agents to assign a 
50/50 distribution of influence. The distribution for each variable is shown in Figure 1, and it reveals 
that across all 9 attributes, the vast majority of respondents perceive themselves to have equal influence 
to their partner, give or take 10% in either direction, and that significant differences observed in the 
influences that primary and secondary agents assign themselves is due to the primary agent perceiving 
their level of influence to be higher than the secondary agent perceives their own influence (or 
conversely that secondary agents perceives themselves to have less influence). 
Table 4: Within-Household Difference in Perceived Influence 
 
 
Vehicle 
Price 
Fuel 
Price 
Registra-
tion 
Annual 
Surcharg
e 
Variable 
Surcharg
e 
Fuel 
Efficienc
y 
Engine 
Capacity 
Seating 
Capacity 
Country 
of Manu. 
Average Diff (P – S) 6.1 6.5 4.6 2.5 2.2 7.1 8.0 3.2 5.0 
Standard Deviation 23.5 24.9 28.9 24.4 25 27.7 31.7 19.2 22.8 
t-value (µ = 0) 3.922 3.904 2.507 1.617 1.388 4.078 4.023 2.516 3.201 
Assign Same Influence 39% 52% 60% 62% 57% 36% 36% 63% 51% 
Primary More 41% 34% 23% 21% 23% 42% 40% 23% 31% 
Primary Less 20% 14% 17% 17% 19% 22% 24% 14% 18% 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Difference in Self-Perceived Influence 
 
5. Differences in Perceived Influence of Self vs Partner 
 
Table 5 provides a detailed examination of how the primary agent assigns influence to themselves versus 
to their partner. In this table it is clearly revealed that, on average, the primary agent views them self to 
be significantly more powerful across all attributes except for annual and variable surcharges. The level 
of influence the primary agent perceives them self to have is particularly strong for vehicle price, fuel 
price, fuel efficiency and country of manufacture. Across all attributes the number of primary agents 
who assign themselves more influence is greater than the number who assign themselves less influence 
than their partner. For secondary agents on the other hand, as displayed in Table 6, there is no significant 
difference in the influence they give themselves versus their partner, indicating that, on average, the 
secondary agent believes that influence is equal across all attributes. On most attributes, the number of 
secondary agents who assign themselves less influence relative to their partner is marginally larger than 
those who assign themselves more. 
 
Table 5: Primary Agent: Perceived Influence of Self vs Partner 
 
 Vehicle Price 
Fuel 
Price 
Registra-
tion 
Annual 
Surcharge 
Variable 
Surcharge 
Fuel 
Efficiency 
Engine 
Capacity 
Seating 
Capacity 
Country of 
Manu. 
Average Diff (P – S) 13.1 11.3 8.5 2.9 2.5 14 14.5 7.7 12.3 
Standard Deviation 32.2 31.7 37.1 32.4 32.8 37.3 39 26.5 30.3 
t-value (µ = 0) 5.706 5.021 3.208 1.277 1.063 5.273 5.222 4.050 5.685 
Assign Same Influence 53% 68% 74% 76% 73% 52% 52% 75% 68% 
More given to Self 37% 26% 17% 13% 15% 35% 35% 18% 26% 
Less given to Self 10% 6% 9% 11% 13% 13% 14% 7% 6% 
 
Table 6: Secondary Agent: Perceived Influence of Self vs Partner 
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 Vehicle Price 
Fuel 
Price 
Registra-
tion 
Annual 
Surcharge 
Variable 
Surcharge 
Fuel 
Efficiency 
Engine 
Capacity 
Seating 
Capacity 
Country of 
Manu. 
Average Diff (P – S) 0.9 -1.6 -0.8 -2.1 -2 -0.2 -1.4 1.2 2.3 
Standard Deviation 29.4 33.9 36.1 29.9 31 31.4 39.6 24.2 31.7 
t-value (µ = 0) 0.436 -0.652 -0.292 -1.001 -0.895 -0.068 -0.503 0.707 1.012 
Assign Same Influence 61% 69% 75% 76% 74% 64% 55% 79% 73% 
More given to Self 18% 14% 12% 11% 12% 18% 20% 10% 15% 
Less given to Self 21% 17% 13% 13% 14% 18% 25% 11% 13% 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Primary Agent: Distribution of Difference in Self versus Partner 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Secondary Agent: Distribution of Difference in Self versus Partner 
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Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the distribution of the difference between influence assigned to the self 
versus the partner for the primary and secondary agents respectively. While both distributions are 
heavily peaked around zero difference in assigned influence, the positive tail for the primary agent 
distribution is noticeably heavier indicating that when there is a difference, it is largely that the primary 
agent is assigning themselves more influence. For the secondary respondents, who again mostly have 
no difference in assigned influence, there is a noticeable small peak just lower than the average 
(indicating activity around the 30/70 influence split). 
 
6. Accuracy of Perceived Influence 
 
In this section we explore whether the influence that one agent thinks that their partner has matches 
their partner’s perception of their own influence. Because the nature of the question forces the influence 
weights to sum to 100, comparing what the primary agent assigns to the secondary versus what the 
secondary assigns them self is identical to comparing what the secondary agents assigns the primary 
agent versus what the primary agent assigns them self. For example, consider a dyad where the primary 
agent assigns 70 influence points to them self and 30 to their partner, whereas the secondary agent 
assigns 60 to them self and 40 to their partner. The primary underweights how much influence the 
secondary agent believes they have (30 – 60 = -30), or correspondingly, the secondary agents 
underweights how much influence the primary agent believes they have (40 – 70 = -30). Under this 
scenario, a positive difference indicates that individuals over-assign influence to their partner relative 
to what their partner believes they themselves have and a negative difference indicates an under-
assignment. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 7. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Primary Agent: Perceived Influence Partner vs Partner’s Perception of Self 
 
 Vehicle Price 
Fuel 
Price 
Registra-
tion 
Annual 
Surcharge 
Variable 
Surcharge 
Fuel 
Efficiency 
Engine 
Capacity 
Seating 
Capacity 
Country of 
Manu. 
Average Diff (P – S) -7.0 -4.9 -3.9 -0.4 -0.3 -6.9 -6.6 -4.4 -7.3 
Standard Deviation 19.9 21.3 22.5 19.4 19.9 20.4 23.3 16.6 21.1 
t-value (µ = 0) -4.929 -3.211 -2.408 -0.294 -0.179 -4.757 -3.942 -3.75 -4.856 
Assign Same Influence 42% 54% 61% 62% 61% 40% 41% 64% 53% 
Over Estimate 17% 15% 15% 19% 20% 21% 22% 13% 14% 
Under Estimate 41% 31% 23% 19% 19% 39% 38% 23% 34% 
 
 
There are significant differences in the amount of influence assigned to a partner and the level of 
influence that the partner assigns to them self for all attributes except the annual and variable surcharges 
(again emphasising the point that both primary and secondary respondents are defaulting to a 50/50 
split of influence in general for these hypothetical attributes). All differences are negative indicating 
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that, on average, a person gives significantly less influence to their partner than that person gives to 
them self. The relatively heavier negative tail in the distribution of differences shown Figure 5 highlight 
this result. 
 
 
Figure 5: Difference in Partner Assigned Influence vs Self Assigned 
 
7. Decomposing Perceived Influence 
 
Regression analysis was performed on each of the influence values that the respondents assigned 
themselves, the results of which are presented in Table 8. Interestingly, no socio-demographics could 
significantly explain variations in perceived influence for the secondary agent in six of the ten 
regressions (specifically, the overall influence measure, fuel price, annual surcharge, variable surcharge, 
fuel efficiency, and seating capacity). This may be a function of the relatively little variation in how 
secondary agents assigned themselves a level of influence for these attributes. The same could be said 
for the primary agent with respect to seating capacity where the vast majority of primary agents assigned 
themselves an equal measure of influence. It is also interesting to note that attitudes seem to play the 
more defining role in determining a person’s perception of the own influence, rather than harder factors 
such as age, gender, income,  hours worked per week or the number of children in the household. 
 
Looking at the proxy for overall influence among primary agents, older respondents perceive 
themselves to have less influence, as do respondents to who are more in agreement with the statement 
that the government should introduce carbon reduction policies and that drivers of CO2 emitting 
vehicles should pay more. One behavioural explanation for this is that older respondents are more likely 
to have been involved in a longer relationship and thus less inclined to believe that they have greater 
influence (as compared to younger respondents) and that those respondents who agree that something 
should be done about carbon emissions and that car use should be exposed to that may be more inclined 
to believe the choice of a CO2 emitting car would be a joint decision.  
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Table 8: Regression: Socio-Demographics against Perceived Influence 
 
 Overall Influence Vehicle Price Fuel Price Registration Annual Surcharge 
 Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
           
R-squared 0.069 --- 0.049 0.052 0.100 --- 0.039 0.038 0.027 --- 
S.E. Est 11.222 --- 15.765 14.454 15.318 --- 18.134 17.901 16.090 --- 
F 3.499 --- 3.218 5.283 5.250 --- 3.906 3.791 5.387 --- 
           
 Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta 
           
Age -0.129* --- --- --- -0.285** --- --- --- --- --- 
Hours worked / week --- --- --- --- -0.150** --- --- --- --- --- 
Climate change is an 
important issue --- --- -1.757* --- -2.523** --- --- --- --- --- 
Encourage people to use 
enviro. friendly transport --- --- 1.893* -3.543** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Govt. should implement 
carbon reduction policies -1.087* --- --- 2.053** --- --- --- --- -1.610 --- 
Drivers of CO2 emitting cars 
should pay more -1.110* --- --- --- --- --- -2.415** --- --- --- 
(previous attitude 
question)*Age  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.035** --- --- 
Vehicle emissions charge is 
fair to all road users 1.634** --- 1.502** --- --- --- 2.427** --- --- --- 
Vehicle emissions charge 
effective in reducing CO2 --- --- --- --- 1.300** --- --- -1.805** --- --- 
 
* = significant at 0.10, ** = significant at 0.05 
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Table 8: Regression: Socio-Demographics against Perceived Influence (cont.) 
 
 Variable Surcharge Fuel Efficiency Engine Capacity Seating Capacity Country of Manufacture 
 Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
           
R-squared 0.036 --- 0.053 --- 0.071 0.032 --- --- 0.076 0.038 
S.E. Est 16.252 --- 18.212 --- 18.956 19.587 --- --- 15.071 15.652 
F 7.168 --- 3.504 --- 3.606 3.171 --- --- 3.538 3.773 
           
 Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta 
           
Age --- --- -0.218* --- -0.242** --- --- --- --- --- 
Gender --- --- --- --- 6.427** --- --- --- --- --- 
Age*Gender --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.087* 
Income --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.00008** --- 
Age*Hours worked --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.004** --- 
Encourage people to use 
enviro. friendly transport --- --- --- --- --- -2.289** --- --- --- --- 
Govt. should implement 
carbon reduction policies -1.876** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.841** --- 
(previous attitude 
question)*Age --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.032** 
Drivers of CO2 emitting cars 
should pay more --- --- -2.483** --- -2.117** --- --- --- --- --- 
(previous attitude 
question)*Age --- --- --- --- --- 0.032** --- --- --- --- 
Vehicle emissions charge is 
fair to all road users --- --- 1.857** --- 2.192** --- --- --- 1.651** --- 
 
* = significant at 0.10, ** = significant at 0.05 
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With respect to vehicle price, primary agents who felt climate change is an important issue assign 
themselves a lower level of influence, perhaps reflective of a more global concern and that the 
household should move jointly on the issue. On the other hand, those who think that people should be 
encouraged to use environmentally friendly transport and that vehicle emissions charging is fair to all 
road users assign themselves a higher level of influence. Perhaps this is a function of agreement being 
a proxy for knowledge about these schemes, with greater knowledge driving greater influence. With 
respect to the secondary agent, those individuals who agree with encouraging environmentally friendly 
transport assign themselves a lower influence; perhaps because they are the secondary user of the car 
and are happy to take alternative (most likely public transport) that is cheaper and friendlier to the 
environment. Secondary agents who agree that the government should implement carbon reduction 
policies assign themselves a higher level of influence, perhaps seeking to have greater control of the 
price of the vehicle given that environmentally friendly vehicles (and other technology in general) 
typically have higher purchase prices. 
 
For primary agents, older respondents, respondents who work more hours per week and who agree that 
climate change is an important issue all perceive themselves to have relatively lower influence over the 
fuel price attribute, whereas the those who agree that emissions charging is an effective CO2 reduction 
policy assign a higher influence. With respect to vehicle registration costs when the primary agent is 
more in agreement with the statement that the drivers of CO2 emitting cars should pay more, their 
perceived level of influence over the attribute is lower. The same is true for both the annual and variable 
surcharge when the primary agent believes that the government should implement carbon reduction 
policies. Again, these positive environmental perspectives about carbon reduction and emissions 
charging are likely to have financial implications for the household, or perhaps are indicative of a person 
who is generally more conciliatory in their attitudes. With respect to registration costs, older secondary 
agents who agree that drivers of CO2 emitting cars should pay more give themselves high levels of 
influence over this attribute. 
 
Given that the fuel efficiency of the motor vehicle may only noticeably affect the primary vehicle user 
(in terms of number of refuelling stops needed over a week and/or the direct out of pocket expense that 
is a function of how much fuel the vehicle uses), it is not surprising that significant descriptors could 
only be found for these respondents. In particular, older primary agents perceive themselves to have 
less power, as do those who agree that drivers of CO2 emitting vehicles should pay more. Primary 
agents who agree that vehicle emissions charging is fair to all road users assign themselves greater 
influence over the fuel efficiency of the vehicle (again a potential function of how knowledgeable the 
respondent might feel they are with respect to vehicle emissions charging).  
 
With respect to engine capacity, again older primary agents assign themselves less influence, however 
in fleshing out a gender stereotype, primary agents who are male assign themselves significantly more 
influence over the size of the vehicle’s engine. One the other hand, older secondary agents who agree 
that drivers of CO2 emitting vehicles should pay more give themselves more influence over engine 
capacity. Lastly, older male primary agents and primary agents with lower individual incomes give 
themselves less power over the vehicle’s country of manufacture, as do primary agents who agree that 
the government should implement carbon reduction policies. With respect to secondary agents, older 
men assign themselves less influence, but older respondents who agree that governments should 
implement carbon reduction policies give themselves a higher amount of relative influence, potentially 
as cars from different countries may be seen as more or less environmentally sound (e.g. Japanese 
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vehicles), particularly among older respondents. 
 
8. Influence Revealed by the Group Choice 
 
Unlike previous studies influence within group choice, the influence as uncovered via the stated 
preference experiment, that is to say the choices of the primary and secondary agents and the group 
choice as a function of the utilities of the respective agents across each of the choice attributes, are 
estimated simultaneously. Given the exploratory nature of this methodological approach, initial research 
has been completed using multinomial logit models. It should be noted that while random parameters 
can be estimated, the MNL gives potentially the best match to the average perceived influence measures 
discussed. Also, while it is possible to estimate alternative specific parameters within the individual and 
group choice models, it was felt that for this study all parameters would be generic as the perceived 
influence question only prompted respondents to think generically. The model was estimated in Python 
BIOGEME (Bierlaire 2003) and the results are presented in Table 9. 
 
It can be seen that, while agents may ascribe different levels of influence to themselves, when it comes 
to making a group choice only a smaller subset of parameters may matter; previous work on this data 
set has examined the trading behaviour of respondents in this data set and found plausible evidence for 
a reduced set of factors being important in the group decision context (Beck et al. 2013). In driving the 
group choice cheaper prices are preferred by both agents, as are vehicles with larger seating capacity. 
Relative to petrol and hybrid engines, there is a strong dislike for diesel fuelled vehicles. The alternative 
specific constants from the group choice equation simply show if a certain combination of alternatives 
that the primary and secondary agent may chose is more or less likely to lead to agreement. Of particular 
interest are the theta parameters estimated as per Equation (6). Under this specification, a theta 
parameter equal to zero is equivalent to a power weight of 0.5; that is to say it is equivalent to a joint 
influence outcome. The theta estimates for the vehicle price and seating capacity attributes are not 
different to zero, indicating that influence over these attributes is jointly shared. On the other hand, the 
theta estimated around the alternative specific constant for diesel is significantly positive indicating that 
the preferences of the primary agent for diesel is of greater influence in the ultimate choice of the group 
(the theta value is equivalent to a weighting parameter of 0.865). 
 
Table 9: Estimates of Preference and Influence 
 
Variable Parameter t-value 
   
Vehicle Price (Primary) -0.0133 -5.51 
Vehicle Price (Secondary) -0.0152 -6.2 
   
Seating Capacity (Primary) 0.102 2.03 
Seating Capacity (Secondary) 0.181 4.09 
   
Diesel (Primary) -0.303 -3.18 
Diesel (Secondary) -0.498 -5.17 
   
Group Choice ASCs (Primary-Secondary) 
   
Petrol – Petrol 0.181 1.82 
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Petrol –Diesel -2.090 -7.97 
Petrol – Hybrid -2.240 -10.08 
Diesel – Petrol -2.010 -9.38 
Diesel –Diesel 0.072 0.79 
Diesel – Hybrid -1.950 -8.22 
Hybrid – Petrol -2.090 -9.97 
Hybrid - Diesel -1.930 -8.06 
   
Theta Parameters 
   
θVehicle Price -0.819 -0.86 
θSeating Capacity -1.700 -0.68 
θDiesel 1.860 2.46 
   
Model Fit 
   
Initial LL -4130.782  
Final LL -3513.341  
Rho 0.149  
Choice Obs 940  
 
 
9. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Overall, the modelled parameters indicate that in the effort to make a group choice, agents are seemingly 
using a simplified decision making metric, whereby they are trading over alternatives (notably 
preferring petrol and hybrid vehicles and diesels only when the primary agents relative disutility is less 
than that of the secondary agent), save for some basic uniformity of agreement over price and seating 
capacity. This somewhat mirrors what the agents themselves perceive to be the case, as differences 
observed in the way in which respondents assess their own influence is largely at the margins and really 
only observed in the case of the primary agent. For example, the majority of secondary agents report a 
(near) equal allocation of influence to each person, whereas a slight number of primary agents believe 
they have more power but this is often expressed as a 60/40 allocation of influence. 
However, it is interesting to note that the primary agents, the main user of the automobile, do view 
themselves to be significantly more influential than their partner, view themselves to be significantly 
more influential than what their partner thinks they are, and perhaps significantly more influential than 
they actually are. This may be explained by the fact that 55% of the initial independent choices made 
by agents corresponding, meaning that no negotiation was needed. Most of this occurred because both 
agents selected petrol of hybrid vehicles, in other words disagreement was typically only observed when 
one of the agents selected the diesel vehicle and then resolved when the secondary agent revised their 
choice to that diesel engine. In this data set, it is difficult to fully confirm if the perceived level of 
influence matches the actual due to the high proportion of individual choices that result in an immediate 
equilibrium. 
 
It must be noted that while respondents were expressly instructed to make their own individual choices 
(and had no idea that those choices would be compared to their partners), there may be some 
respondents who may have treated the experiment as a “guessing game” and given that the motor 
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vehicle is a large household item, preference structure and strength of preference may be well-known 
within the household. The behaviour of respondents with respect to the hypothetical attributes of annual 
and variable surcharging provide preliminary evidence of this, as the default perception of influence 
over these attributes was a 50/50 split with little deviation. Future research will drill down more deeply 
into the choices where there is initial disagreement and examine how influence is played out under these 
conditions, but it would also be interesting to research choices where individual preferences may be 
more disparate.  
 
In analysing the way in which respondents perceive their own influence, when age is a significant 
predictor the impact is such that older respondents are observed to perceive themselves to have less 
influence. This result is behavioural plausible as older respondents are more likely to have been in 
longer term relations where bargaining is more routine, or may be more likely to be purchasing a vehicle 
to serve a household need. Conversely, younger respondents may be part of a household but could be 
purchasing the vehicle almost exclusively for them. With respect to the secondary agent very few 
significant factors could be identified that explained perceived influence, most likely due to insufficient 
variation in the influence scores assigned by secondary agents. Variables were significant socio-
demographics could be found were for vehicle price and vehicle registration, perhaps the largest sunk 
costs of vehicle ownership. Thus, perhaps the secondary agent (not the prime user of the vehicle) may 
only seek to differing levels of influence when the purchase of the vehicle may have a large impact on 
the household budget. 
 
Generally, respondents who are more in agreement with environmental awareness or friendliness 
statements report a lower self-perceived influence. This is consistent with other literature which finds 
that people who express environmentally friendly attitudes are more likely to be altruistic (Hopper and 
Nielsen 1991, Schultz and Zelezny 1999). The exception is with respect to attitudes about vehicle 
emissions charging being fair to all road users, with those in higher agreement with this statement 
perceiving themselves to have more influence over the relevant variables. Behaviourally, it could be 
argued that to assess something as being fair required a greater intimacy and thus knowledge about the 
impacts of such policies. If a person views them self to be knowledgeable about a policy that influences 
the cost of using a vehicle it is consistent that this expertise would translate into greater perceived 
influence. 
 
Overall, this study has shown some discrepancies in perceived versus actual influence both within and 
across groups. In this data, however, it seems to translate minimally to the choice of the group where 
only a few key variables are important, either because the group choice is constrained by budgets or 
vehicles that must be fit for a defined household purpose. Given the paucity of research in this area (let 
alone the wider area of group choice), we feel that we have made a significant contribution in starting 
analysis of perceived influence. From a policy perspective, our research has shown that attitudes play 
an important role in the level of influence an individual thinks they have over a decision. In the context 
of vehicle choice, greater awareness of environmental policies to reduce CO2 and moderate vehicle use 
lead to significant differences in perceived influence. Where an attitude does impact on the level of 
influence an individual thinks they have over a group decision, the more likely it is that the agent will 
either advocate their position in search of a true group choice or urge the group to follow their lead as 
an expert. For example, facilitate more joint group buy-in over vehicle price, fuel price, fuel efficiency 
and engine capacity; or a matter such as agreeing that vehicle emissions likely being an effective policy, 
attempting to get the group to follow their led on features of a motor vehicle would be dramatically 
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impacted by emissions charging such as fuel efficiency and engine capacity. It is likely that similar 
attitudinal levers exist across the myriad of choices that groups make. In motor vehicle choice the raising 
awareness of vehicle emissions charging may be a way to bring discussion over a lot of vehicle features 
that directly affect emissions to the table, as respondents seek to exert their perceived influence, but it 
is unlikely to result in an impact in the group choice itself. 
 
Future research will seek to make further inroads into this topic, specifically we will seek to examine if 
perceived power is a facilitator or impediment to group consensus, if perceived power influences the 
choices of individuals and groups and if perceptions of power manifest themselves in actual power. 
Outside of this proposed research, we encourage the examination of influence over choices that may 
maximise negotiation; in this instance the household preferences for motor vehicles are likely to be 
well-known (Beck et al. 2012), particularly over a non-labelled choice experiment. Additionally, it 
would also be fascinating to establish if perceptions of influence are endogenous to the negotiation 
process (i.e. asking what they perceive their influence to be both before and after the choice).  
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